


ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ БЮДЖЕТНОЕ УЧРЕЖДЕНИЕ НАУКИ
ИНСТИТУТ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ И КАНАДЫ
ИМЕНИ АКАДЕМИКА Г.А. АРБАТОВА
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УТВЕРЖДЕНО

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ПРОГРАММА

Вступительного экзамена по иностранному языку

Английский язык

По научным специальностям

5.5.2 Политические институты, процессы, технологии

5.5.4 Международные отношения, глобальные и региональные исследования

5.2.5 Мировая экономика

Москва, 2025

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Общие положения

Программа вступительного испытания по иностранному языку для поступления на обучение по всем реализуемым в ИСКРАН программам подготовки научных и научно-педагогических кадров в аспирантуре (далее Программа), сформирована на основе федеральных государственных требований к структуре программ подготовки научных и научно-педагогических кадров в аспирантуре по соответствующим специальностям.

Программой устанавливается:

- форма, условия аттестации, структура и процедура сдачи вступительного испытания;
- шкала оценивания;
- максимальное и минимальное количество баллов для успешного прохождения вступительного испытания;
- критерии оценки ответов.

Форма, процедура сдачи вступительного испытания, а также шкала оценивания и критерии оценки ответов экзаменуемого, установленные Программой, не зависят от языка проведения вступительного испытания.

1.2. Организация и проведение вступительного испытания осуществляется в соответствии с Правилами приема, утвержденными приказом директора ИСКРАН, действующими на текущий год поступления.

1.3. По результатам вступительного испытания, поступающий имеет право подать на апелляцию о нарушении, по мнению поступающего, установленного порядка проведения вступительного испытания и (или) о несогласии с полученной оценкой результатов вступительного испытания в порядке, установленном Правилами приема, действующими на текущий год поступления.

Форма, содержание и требования к вступительному испытанию

1. Цель экзамена – Оценить уровень владения иностранным языком и определить степень его соответствия профессиональным задачам, стоящим перед поступающим. В частности, на вступительном экзамене проверяется уровень речевых компетенций кандидата, включающие в себя чтение, говорение (монологическая и диалогическая речь) аудирование, а также соблюдение лексических и грамматических норм иностранного языка в рамках, необходимых для осуществления научной деятельности.

2. Учитывая перспективы практической и научной деятельности аспирантов, на вступительных экзаменах кандидатам предлагаются задания, оценивающие следующие речевые компетенции:

Говорение.

1. Краткий рассказ о сфере научных интересов (1-2 минуты). *Время на подготовку 5 минут.*

2. Обсуждение с экзаменатором вопросов, касающихся специальности и сферы научных интересов (2-3 вопроса от экзаменаторов)

3. Обсуждение с экзаменаторами актуальных тем, касающихся социально-политической жизни общества. (3-4 вопроса экзаменаторов). *Без предварительной подготовки.*

Оценивается умение представлять свою точку зрения, адекватно воспринимать вопросы экзаменатора и давать на них логически обоснованные развёрнутые ответы; соблюдение грамматических и лексических норм, а также содержательность, логичность, связность, смысловая и структурная завершенность высказывания.

Перевод. Перевод оригинального текста на иностранном языке научного или общественно-политического характера объемом 350-400 печатных знаков. *Параграф для перевода дается заранее. Время на перевод - 10 минут. Перевод представляется экзаменаторам при устном ответе. Можно делать записи. Можно пользоваться бумажным словарем. Использование электронных словарей не допускается!*

Оценивается общая адекватность перевода, в частности отсутствие смысловых искажений и соответствие нормам языка перевода.

Аудирование. Прослушивание аудиозаписи общественно-политического или страноведческого характера длительностью 2-3 минуты и ответы на вопросы экзаменатора (3-4 вопроса). *Вопросы в письменном виде даются заранее. Аудиозапись прослушивается два раза.*

Оценивается умение выделять главную мысль и извлекать необходимую информацию.

Чтение. Чтение оригинального текста научного или общественно-политического характера объемом 2000-2500 печатных знаков и ответы на вопросы экзаменатора по тексту (3-5 вопросов). *На выполнение задания отводится 20 минут. Можно пользоваться бумажным словарем. Использование электронных словарей не допускается! Вопросы в письменном виде даются вместе с текстом.*

Оценивается умение выделять главную мысль в тексте, извлекать необходимую информацию, правильно интерпретировать точку зрения автора, а также умение пользоваться словарем.

Требования к вступительному экзамену

Вступительный экзамен проводится в письменной и устной форме. Для успешной сдачи вступительного экзамена в аспирантуру по иностранному языку поступающий должен владеть грамматическим и лексическим материалом в соответствии с действующими программами и обладать следующими компетенциями:

-умение представить свою научную работу и беседовать на темы, связанные со сферой своих научных интересов, с учетом правил речевого этикета, вести диалог в ситуации официального общения; владение неподготовленной диалогической речью.

-умение читать оригинальную литературу по специальности, извлекая информацию, необходимую для научного исследования, и правильно интерпретируя авторскую оценку.

-умение читать и переводить литературу по специальности на иностранном языке, ориентироваться в научном иноязычном тексте, умение пользоваться словарем.

Фонд оценочных средств

На вступительном экзамене будущий аспирант (соискатель) должен продемонстрировать владение иностранным языком на уровне, позволяющем ему осуществлять научно-исследовательскую деятельность по соответствующему направлению исследований в рамках научной специальности программы аспирантуры по решению задач в сфере научного и профессионального общения с использованием иностранного языка

Поступающий для получения положительной оценки должен проявить следующие показатели:

логичность и смысловая полнота высказываний, наличие причинно-следственных связей, использование внутритекстовых связей;

5 баллов (отлично/хорошо): презентация логична и содержательна, разделы выступления отличаются завершенностью и последовательностью, абитуриентом используются внутритекстовые связи.

3 балла (удовлетворительно): некоторые фрагменты презентации могут быть нелогичными, некоторые разделы не завершены и/или непоследовательны, абитуриентом редко используются внутритекстовые связи.

2 балла (неудовлетворительно): презентация нелогична, разделы выступления незавершенные или непоследовательные, абитуриентом не используются внутритекстовые связи.

лексическая и грамматическая корректность;

5 баллов (отлично/хорошо): речь абитуриента лексически и грамматически корректна, абитуриент грамотно строит словосочетания и предложения, использует сложные синтаксические конструкции.

3 балла (удовлетворительно): в целом речь абитуриента лексически и грамматически корректна, абитуриент может допускать незначительные ошибки при построении словосочетаний и предложений, использует однотипные синтаксические конструкции.

2 балла (неудовлетворительно): зачастую абитуриентом допускаются лексические и грамматические ошибки, построение синтаксических конструкций происходит преимущественно неверно.

соответствие выступления теме, использование тематического вокабуляра в речи;

5 баллов (отлично/хорошо): выступление абитуриента в полной мере соответствует выбранной теме, им активно применяются тематические лексические единицы.

3 балла (удовлетворительно): выступление абитуриента соответствует выбранной теме, могут присутствовать незначительные отступления, тематические лексические единицы применяются, но могут присутствовать ошибки применения.

2 балла (неудовлетворительно): выступление абитуриента не соответствует выбранной теме, тематический вокабуляр не используется, либо используется ошибочно.

культура публичного выступления, ораторское мастерство, соблюдение временного регламента;

5 баллов (отлично/хорошо): абитуриент соблюдает культуру публичного выступления, следует требованиям временного регламента.

3 балла (удовлетворительно): абитуриентом в целом соблюдается культура публичного выступления с небольшими отступлениями, может незначительным образом нарушаться временной регламент.

2 балла (неудовлетворительно): абитуриентом не соблюдается культура публичного выступления, не соблюдается временной регламент.

Перечень рекомендуемой литературы:

1. М.Г. Рубцова. Чтение и перевод научной и технической литературы: лексико-грамматический справочник. Учебник. 2-е изд. испр. и доп. М.: Астрель: АСТ, 2010.
2. О.В. Сиполс. Develop Your Reading Skills: Comprehension and Translation Practice. Обучение чтению и переводу (английский язык). Учебное пособие. М.: Флинта: Наука, 2007.
3. М.Л. Гольдберг. Сборник научно-популярных текстов для работы на кандидатском семестре. Учебное пособие. Изд. 5, испр. и дополн. М.: Советский писатель, 2011.
4. И.Л. Голова. Лексические и грамматические особенности английской научной литературы гуманитарного профиля. Пассивные конструкции. Учебное пособие. 2-е изд. испр. и дополн. М.: Советский писатель, 2011.
5. М.М. Сизов. Комплексное пособие на материале научно-популярных текстов на английском языке (обучение чтению, аудированию, говорению, письму и переводу). Учебное пособие. М.: Советский писатель, 2008.
6. Рубцова М.Г. Полный курс английского языка. Учебник-самоучитель. Четвертое издание, исправленное и дополненное. М.: Астрель: АСТ, 2008.
7. Павликова М.А. Лексико-грамматические тесты по обучению пониманию английского научного текста. Учебное пособие. М.: Советский писатель, 2007.
8. О.В. Сиполс. Test your grammar, vocabulary and reading comprehension. Учебное пособие. М.: Советский писатель, 2007.
9. О.В. Сиполс, Г.А. Широкова. Англо-русский учебный словарь с синонимами и антонимами. Общенаучная лексика. М.: Флинта: Наука, 2003.
10. О.В. Сиполс, Г.А. Широкова. Англо-русский словарь начинающего переводчика. М.: Флинта, 2008.
11. Н.М. Абакарова. Fine Arts (Portraits: 1700 years). Английский язык. Научный текст с упражнениями. М.: ИЯз РАН, 2011.
12. Г.А. Широкова. Археология. Английский язык. Научный текст с комментариями и упражнениями. Учебное пособие. М.: Советский писатель, 2010.
13. The Economics. Book Big Ideas Simply Explained. By DK, Niall Kishtainy, George Abbot, John Farndon, Frank Kennedy, James Meadway, Christopher Wallace, Marcus Weeks.
14. The Politics. Book Big Ideas Simply Explained. By DK, Niall Kishtainy, George Abbot, John Farndon, Frank Kennedy, James Meadway, Christopher Wallace, Marcus Weeks.

Оригинальные научно-популярные и научные тексты в соответствии с избранной специальностью, в том числе в следующих источниках: (впн)

1. <https://www.economist.com/>
2. <https://www.nytimes.com/>
3. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/>
4. <https://nationalpost.com/>
5. <https://www.wsj.com/>
6. <https://www.chicagotribune.com/>
7. <https://www.latimes.com/>
8. <https://www.usatoday.com/>
9. <https://nypost.com/>
10. <https://www.bostonglobe.com/>
11. <https://www.thebulletin.be/>
12. <https://www.postandcourier.com/>
13. <https://nationalinterest.org/>

Примеры текстов для вступительного экзамена по английскому языку

1. Trump and Putin Find Common Ground on One Issue: Biden

The Alaska summit between the U.S. and Russian leaders showcased their mutual animosity for the former president.

By Peter Baker

The New York Times, August 17, 2025

URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/17/us/politics/trump-putin-common-ground-biden.html>

President Trump and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia [did not agree on a cease-fire](#) to the war in Ukraine during their meeting in Alaska. But they did agree on something else: They both despise Joe Biden.

During their private meeting and their public appearance in Anchorage on Friday, both leaders blamed Mr. Biden for the war in Ukraine, never mind that Mr. Putin was the one who ordered troops to invade his neighbor and keeps authorizing strikes against civilian targets.

The Russian president complained that Mr. Biden did not accede to Russian demands before the full-scale invasion three and a half years ago, and he played to the current president's ego by agreeing that the war would not have happened had Mr. Trump still been in office in 2022. By Mr. Trump's account, Mr. Putin behind closed doors also endorsed the lie that Mr. Trump actually won the 2020 election, only to have it stolen by Democrats.

"I think that he respects our country now," Mr. Trump said of Mr. Putin during a post-summit [interview on Fox News](#). "He didn't respect it under Biden, I can tell you that. He had no respect for it. I was so happy when he said this would have never happened. This — all those lives would be saved if they had a competent — if we had a competent president."

It was unorthodox, to say the least, to see a sitting American president join a foreign dictator accused of war crimes onstage in Anchorage to bash a former American president. But it underscored that Mr. Trump, with his increasingly authoritarian tendencies, in some ways finds more common ground with the repressive leader of Russia than he does with his own country's leaders.

Indeed, even though he expressed frustration with Mr. Putin in the weeks leading up to the Alaska meeting over the war in Ukraine, Mr. Trump has still never publicly said anything as harsh about the Russian leader as he does with [great regularity about Mr. Biden](#) — or, for that matter, [about former President Barack Obama](#) and even, to a lesser extent, [former President George W. Bush](#).

In that, too, Mr. Putin is like-minded. He has long nursed grievances against Mr. Bush and Mr. Obama, often venting during interviews and meetings about how he believes they mistreated him when they were in office. Mr. Putin, who has dealt with five American presidents during his quarter-century in power, has come to believe that they are all more or less alike in disregarding Russian concerns, according to people who have heard his rants — all, that is, except Mr. Trump.

The shared animosity toward Mr. Biden provided a moment of enemy-of-my-enemy convergence between the two leaders during their Alaska encounter. And while analysts said it reflected genuine resentment on Mr. Putin's part, it also underscored his penchant for finding ways to play to the values and vanities of his foreign counterparts.

A former K.G.B. officer once charged with managing agents during a Cold War stint in East Germany, Mr. Putin has long demonstrated a skill at adapting to the particulars of the person across the table. He does his research. He reads his briefings. He figures out what matters to them. And he finds ways of currying favor when it suits his interests.

When he hosted Strobe Talbott, a Russia specialist serving as President Bill Clinton's deputy secretary of state, Mr. Putin made a point of mentioning Fyodor Tyutchev and Vladimir Mayakovsky, the Russian poets Mr. Talbott studied at Yale and Oxford. "He wanted his visitor to know that he'd done his homework," Mr. Talbott wrote in his memoir.

When Mr. Bush, a man known for his deep faith, first met Mr. Putin, a man not known for his deep faith, in Ljubljana, Slovenia, in 2001, the Russian made a deep impression on the American by relating [a story about a cross his mother had given him as a child](#).

The cross was the only object to survive a fire that burned down Mr. Putin's dacha, a sign of its importance, or so he told Mr. Bush. Mr. Putin at the time was not actually wearing the cross that was supposedly so dear to him, but a few months later took it to Genoa, Italy, to show Mr. Bush at their next encounter.

Mr. Putin likewise played to European leaders, at least in his early years in office. But he also used their personal vulnerabilities against them when he thought it would give him an advantage.

Knowing that Angela Merkel, then the chancellor of Germany, was afraid of dogs after once being bitten, Mr. Putin brought his black Labrador to a 2007 meeting and let it sniff around his uncomfortable visitor. Ms. Merkel deemed it a power play and later wrote that Mr. Putin was ["enjoying the situation."](#)

As for Mr. Trump, Mr. Putin understands his insecurity and need for validation. During a meeting in Japan in 2019, according to people in the room at the time, he listened as Mr. Trump boasted that Poland planned to name a military base "Fort Trump" and Israel planned to name a settlement "Trump Heights." Mr. Putin replied drolly, "Maybe they should just name Israel after you, Donald."

Mr. Putin certainly knew what he was doing in Alaska when he aired his disdain for Mr. Biden, grouching that the previous president did not defer to Russian concerns during the months leading up to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

"I tried to convince my former U.S. counterpart that we should not bring the situation to a point fraught with serious repercussions in the form of hostilities, and I said directly at the time that it would be a big mistake," Mr. Putin said, eliding over his own decision to order the invasion.

He went on, unasked, to endorse Mr. Trump's counterfactual version of history. "Today, we hear President Trump saying, 'If I had been president, there would have been no war,'" Mr. Putin said. "I believe it would have been so. I confirm this because President Trump and I have established a generally very good, businesslike and trustworthy contact."

Whether that is true is hard to say. Mr. Trump acts as if the war started with the 2022 invasion, but in fact it began in 2014 when Mr. Putin seized Crimea and territory in eastern Ukraine. The war persisted at a simmering level throughout Mr. Trump's first term and Russia never backed off even with Mr. Trump in office.

If it is true that Russia would not have mounted its full-scale invasion in 2022 had Mr. Trump still been president, Democrats maintain that it would have been because he was willing to let Mr. Putin dominate Ukraine without having to use force.

But Mr. Putin's statement on Friday was just what Mr. Trump wanted to hear. He has taken to calling the Ukraine conflict "Biden's war" — not "Putin's war" — as he deflects blame for failing to fulfill his campaign promise to end the fighting within 24 hours of taking office in January.

During his [interview on Fox with Sean Hannity](#) after the Alaska meeting, Mr. Trump described more efforts by Mr. Putin to stroke him behind closed doors.

"You know, Vladimir Putin said something, one of the most interesting things," Mr. Trump related. "He said, 'Your election was rigged because you have mail-in voting.' He said, 'Mail-in voting, every election.' He said, 'No country has mail-in voting. It's impossible to have mail-in voting and have honest elections.'"

According to Mr. Trump, Mr. Putin continued: "'You won that election by so much.' And that's how he got it. He said, 'And if you would have won, we wouldn't have had a war. You'd have all these millions of people alive now instead of dead.' And he said, 'And you lost it because of mail-in voting. It was a rigged election.'"

In fact, [dozens of countries](#) around the world have allowed some form of postal voting — including Russia, where Mr. Putin [signed a law](#) permitting it in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic. Mr. Trump himself has cast ballots by mail. No independent investigation has found widespread fraud that would have changed the outcome of the 2020 election.

Whether Mr. Putin weighed in on domestic American campaign processes in quite the way Mr. Trump described is unknown. Mr. Trump has proved to be an unreliable narrator of events, often describing private conversations that supposedly substantiate his view of the world.

But if Mr. Putin gave the impression that he agreed that the 2020 election was rigged, he was appealing to one of Mr. Trump's signature fixations — and successfully changed the subject from the demands that he stop the war.

During the interview with Mr. Hannity, Mr. Trump [used the term "mail-in voting" 13 times](#) and the word "rigged" another three times. The word "cease-fire" never passed his lips.

2. “Prioritized Deterrence”: A Roadmap for US Foreign Policy

By Riley Moore

The National Interest, August 18, 2025

URL: <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/prioritized-deterrence-a-roadmap-for-us-foreign-policy>

President Trump’s recent strike on Iran provides a model for America’s future military engagement around the world—balancing strategic interests with industrial capacity and political will.

On June 22nd, the United States Air Force and Navy conducted “Operation Midnight Hammer” against three Iranian nuclear facilities: Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.

President Donald Trump’s bold and successful strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities put America First foreign policy on full display—defending against a specific threat to American national security with precision and restraint. This strike is also a potentially doctrinal defining moment. Indeed, President Trump may have inaugurated a new era in American grand strategy, one characterized by what I am calling “Prioritized Deterrence.”

The strike on Iran was not about nation-building or human rights. It was specific, targeted, time delimited, and dependent on unique American technical capabilities. The result was denying Iran the ability to threaten America and our allies with nuclear weapons, while opening the door to a more stable future for the region. All of these reflect elements of Prioritized Deterrence.

What Is “Prioritized Deterrence”?

So, what is Prioritized Deterrence? Like realism, Prioritized Deterrence is girded by restraint and guided by quantifiable and inherent constraints placed on the nation, its resources, and our people. Acknowledging these realities forces decision makers to prioritize threats and challenges based on urgency and severity. Decision makers then match questions of time and interest to arenas of American technical dominance. America should strike where and when it can deploy overwhelming force, but only at the highest priority targets and without open-ended commitments in terms of time and resources—commitments we cannot afford given the existential threat posed to America by the Chinese Communist Party.

PD thus retains the traditional deterrence model by sustaining a credible threat to an aggressor and an unacceptable cost for aggression against the United States. Prioritization and technical dominance limit the temptation to engage in games of brinkmanship with every agitator nation, a necessary restraint given resource constraints and the ever-looming potential for escalation. Kinetic military action must be credible, should always be a last resort, and always be deployed on America’s timeline and terms.

Returning to Iran, the United States had a clear national interest in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. A regime that chants “Death to America,” funds terrorism throughout the world, took a hit out against Trump’s life, and kills American servicemembers cannot be trusted with long-range missiles carrying a nuclear payload. Further, a nuclear weapon would help Iran deter the United States and our regional allies from retaliating against Iran and its proxies when they engage in acts of terrorism. Concretely, an Iran that can strike the US with long-range weapons carrying nuclear payloads is much harder to stop from holding the Strait of Hormuz hostage.

This is an important interest, but it is not an unlimited interest. A specific, targeted strike was warranted, and Trump made the decision to undertake such an operation. But when voices in

the United States and Israel pushed to escalate further, Trump firmly declined. Respecting the president's leadership, the Israelis listened, and, despite some unsteadiness, have sustained a ceasefire with Tehran. Stability has followed a brief period of dramatic, strategic clarification and rebalancing. In this respect, the strike mirrors President Trump's 2020 operation against IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, which decisively eliminated a key Iranian target without dragging American forces into a broader conflict. Then, as now, Trump wielded overwhelming strength while managing escalatory risks. Unlike the open-ended interventions of the past, both strikes had clear objectives and defined endpoints—leveraging America's unmatched military capabilities to accomplish what no other nation could, but without sowing the kind of regional instability that can require open-ended commitments.

This is not to say that there was no risk with the kinetic actions conducted on the three nuclear sites in Iran—or in the strike on Soleimani, for that matter. There is always risk involved when bombs start dropping in the Middle East. But thanks to the skill and professionalism of our forces, and the deterrence capabilities we have established in the region, the United States was able to step off the escalation ladder and allowed Iran to save face internally.

Prioritized Deterrence Is About Managing Escalation

This ability to control the escalation cycle is key to successful PD. Consider the debate over regime change in Tehran, either via direct US action or by assisting an Israeli assassination mission. Killing the Supreme Leader, however justified, would ignite chaos, fracture the region, and dramatically increase the odds of America being drawn into another protracted conflict. Such an outcome lacks the support of the American people and would severely constrain American resources. The Supreme Leader is no friend of the United States, and American policymakers must be clear-eyed about that. But there are plenty of governments around the world who hate the United States. Pursuing regime change would have risked repeating the mistakes of Iraq, where the 2003 invasion unleashed sectarian violence that disproportionately impacted Christians in the region, fueled insurgencies, effectively handed control of the country to Iran, took more than 4,000 U.S. servicemembers' lives, and cost more than \$2 trillion with little to no strategic gain. This administration, in an example of Prioritized Deterrence, chose strategic clarity instead of overreach.

The political foundations for PD are strong, at least within the Republican Party. Few remember that then-Governor George W. Bush ran on a restrained foreign policy platform. In his debate with Vice President Al Gore in October 2000, Bush said, "I don't think we can be all things to all people in the world. I think we've got to be very careful when we commit our troops. The vice president and I have a disagreement about the use of troops. He believes in nation building." The democracy agenda-driven cycle of nation building, later championed by Bush, stands in stark contrast to this campaign promise. Certainly 9/11 changed some of America's strategic imperatives. But a quarter century since the attacks, PD, rather than foreign adventurism, has a clear and sustainable political base.

The Mechanics of Prioritized Deterrence

Given that American voters want elected leaders to prioritize our own interests, and only to deter direct threats with military force when necessary, and when no other actors can credibly do so independent of US action, policymakers need to prioritize two considerations.

First, the point of the US military is not simply to fight and win wars, but also to deter conflict before it happens. This requires maintaining American technical superiority on a domain-by-domain basis. In some arenas, exquisite platforms like stealth bombers, will be critical to deterrence. In others, a massive advantage in raw materials will be the deterrent.

To build any of these at scale, we need to have a much larger and more diversified industrial base. The saying goes, “If you want peace, prepare for war.” This does not just mean building more ships. It means building national capacity across the industrial sector so that in the event of a major war, the United States can quickly retool civilian manufacturing to drastically ramp up military production. During World War II, Ford and General Motors repurposed their car assembly lines to produce aircraft, but less obvious industries chipped in as well; the Singer Sewing Machine Company converted factories to make precision parts such as cockpit instruments and components, and IBM pivoted factories to producing fire control systems and sights for bombers. America lacks an equivalent latent capacity today, constraining the range of options even a PD driven president can embrace. It is notable that the Chinese understand this concept well: it is noted in the introduction to the “Made in China 2025” plan that, “Without strong manufacturing, there is no national prosperity.” If a country cannot create the goods necessary to fight a war, it cannot possibly challenge those countries that can.

Second, policymakers need to exercise humility about where they commit the United States to act. There are countries that for a litany of reasons—historical, cultural, religious, or otherwise—do not want or cannot become Western-style democracies, at least not on a timeline or at a cost that the American people will bear. Policymakers should be mindful of this reality, and resist the temptation to extend security guarantees around the world. Without robust popular support, American foreign policy cannot be effective.

President Barack Obama’s “red line” in Syria is a case in point. By imprudently threatening that the use of chemical weapons by Bashar Al-Assad would trigger a US response, Obama exposed the United States to a potentially open-ended conflict on someone else’s terms. When push came to shove and Assad used chemical weapons against his own people, Obama was unwilling to face the consequences of meeting his open-ended commitment, and declined to intervene. This was certainly the correct decision. Yet by showing that America’s “red lines” could be crossed with impunity, Obama diminished America’s deterrent credibility and emboldened our adversaries. Russia invaded Crimea less than two years later, initiating the war in the Donbas region that continues today.

Realism and Prioritized Deterrence

Returning to the question of doctrine, how does PD differ from realism? Firstly, PD is sufficiently specific that it can be assessed and debated both prospectively and historically. Did decisionmakers rightly estimate America’s constraints? Did they match time and threat to domains of technical superiority? Was a given intervention successful at resetting the international stage? By contrast, realism can be something of an empty vessel. On the one hand, a kind of runaway realism can provide endless justification for kinetic actions around the globe to disrupt and destroy any threat to the United States—up to and including regime change. Indeed, many neoconservatives do not identify themselves as such, describing themselves as “realists” and finding realist justifications for neoconservative goals. On the other hand, a great number of self-identified realists become fixated on ill-defined obsessions with second-order effects and blowback, such that they wind up suffering from paralysis by analysis. We can roughly assess risks and rewards. Pretending that we cannot is foolish.

Getting these answers right will require an open and honest debate among ideological allies. PD, in other words, relies on a robust mutual commitment to hear out dissenting voices within the movement. Indeed, it provides a series of key questions around which debate could transpire. In contrast to the moralizing and supercilious debate leading to the Iraq War, opposing voices in the debate over prioritization are critical to ensuring prudence, focus, and public support. The days of *National Review* tarring war skeptics as unpatriotic should be left in the rearview mirror for good.

Our movement and this administration are at a crossroads. None of Iran's proxies, partners, or allies have come to Tehran's immediate aid. As a result, the opportunity for peace may have presented itself. With Iran isolated, there is a very small window to provide greater stability in the region. This is not to say America can trust the Iranians—but with negotiations, confidence-building measures, and a serious verification regime in place, we can make significant progress. Crucially, that progress will be backed by a credible threat of massive and overwhelming force.

At the same time, only six months into President Trump's second term, factions within the Republican Party are already warring over who will take the mantle after his time in office comes to an end. War hawks in the party are actively trying to claim the mantle of an "America First" foreign policy and append it to a reckless neoconservative nation-building agenda. To defeat them, Trump's would-be successors would do well to model their approach to his successful strike on Iran. American foreign policy should embrace Prioritized Deterrence—a calculation of political will, national interest, deterrent effect, capital capacity, industrial capability, and strategic outcome priority alignment.

3. The Man Who Saw the Future of Africa

By Howard W. French

The New York Times, August 19, 2025

URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/19/opinion/africa-future-kwame-nkrumah.html>

Not long after John F. Kennedy was inaugurated as president, he received his first visit from a foreign leader. He had chosen Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first president. By today's standards, in which Africa seems to sit on the far margins of world affairs, the selection is practically unimaginable.

But even as a senator, Mr. Kennedy had begun to see Africa — with its enormous landmass, newly independent countries and young population — as a continent full of promise. By one count, during his presidential campaign speeches in 1960 he mentioned Africa 479 times. As president, he was keen to compete for influence there with the Soviet Union and even side with anticolonialism, courting tension with America's European allies.

Until Mr. Kennedy's assassination, Mr. Nkrumah remained the American president's most important African interlocutor, a fact that reflects both the Ghanaian leader's charisma and the tremendous prestige he had earned on the continent by peacefully leading his country to independence from colonial rule in 1957. Driven by his belief in Pan-Africanism, Mr. Nkrumah worked tirelessly to overcome the Balkanizing impact of colonial rule across Africa.

As the world's powers turn away from the continent, it's a vision that may hold the key to realizing Africa's potential today.

The United States did not withdraw from Africa after Mr. Kennedy's death, but the continent was sharply downgraded in the hierarchy of Washington's interests. America's involvement quickly narrowed to a policy of near-zero-sum competition with Moscow, in which each superpower forged alliances with the aim of restraining the influence of the other. Most of these involved military relationships and limited financial support to dictatorships of one kind or another, with little regard for democracy, governance or long-term economic development.

Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet empire, American engagement with Africa has declined sharply and become largely limited to humanitarian assistance. Under President Trump, even this is now in doubt, with the virtual elimination of the United States Agency for International Development and apparent plans to end support for PEPFAR, a program created by George W. Bush that has had remarkable success in combating H.I.V. in Africa.

This summer, a new nadir was reached when [news outlets reported](#) that the White House was considering restricting entry to the United States from 25 African countries, in addition to the seven that were covered in a ban announced in June. And even as Washington raises barriers to immigration from Africa, it has begun to explore ways of using the continent as a dumping ground not only for Africans deported from the United States but also for people from other continents.

It is tempting to see the United States as a complete outlier, but its withdrawal from Africa reflects broader developments in the world. Europe's involvement with the continent has also declined. This is attested to by France's retreat from a large swath of West Africa in the Sahel, after years of failed efforts to defeat a variety of Islamic insurgencies. Today the biggest African concern of the former colonizing powers — as well as of the European Union generally — is preventing growing migration from the continent.

Even China, after more than two decades of a determined push to expand political and economic ties to Africa, has put on the brakes and started to focus elsewhere. After expanding rapidly from a tiny base, Chinese economic involvement with Africa has plateaued, as Beijing has quietly reassessed the difficulties of realizing profits on the continent. Chinese lending to Africa peaked in 2016, with its investment there now relatively flat.

In light of trends like these, Mr. Nkrumah's logic about how Africa should engage the outside world appears remarkably sound. His determined nonalignment was based on more than the principled belief that African countries should be free to pursue their interests with whichever partners they wished. He was leery of the proposition that any foreign partner — even a United States led by Mr. Kennedy — would commit to Africa's development in the long term. He believed that this was, above all, the duty of Africans.

At the time, Mr. Nkrumah was opposed and derided by some fellow African leaders for what they saw as his unrealistic dream of merging dozens of newly formed countries to form a continental government, perhaps with him at the helm. His ideas were more subtle, though, and his tactical vision more patient than he was given credit for in his day.

As long as the continent was composed of its legacy jigsaw countries, most of them small in size and population — and many of them landlocked, condemning them to additional poverty and instability — they would remain underdeveloped. The small size of their markets would make it all but impossible to industrialize or to sustain engagement with the outside world on favorable terms. This implies more than the kind of naked extraction of fossil fuels and minerals that is commonplace now and a shift to local transformation of the continent's resources and commodities.

The Ghanaian leader saw this move toward larger units, both economically and politically, as a matter of successive voluntary steps — with states joining to integrate their markets and road and rail networks, then perhaps merging at the subregional level before any eventual attempt to form a nation that would encompass, say, all of West, East or Southern Africa. If it were ever to come about, a continental union lay in a distant future.

One surprising source for this vision was the Federalist Papers. While he was a college and graduate school student in Pennsylvania in the 1930s and '40s, Mr. Nkrumah became deeply familiar with the history of how a group of small colonies bound themselves together to forge an independent, federal country that became much richer and stronger than the sum of its parts. This was the future he saw for his continent, as he explained to his peers at the founding summit of the Organization of African Unity, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1963.

Mr. Nkrumah's fellow leaders rejected his idea. But the continent's subsequent history — six decades of deprivation, poverty and corruption — has laid bare the costs of having a plethora of small countries that largely turn their backs to one another. In the absence of collaboration, they remain poor and condemned to engage as weaklings with the outside world.

In demographic terms, Mr. Kennedy was right that Africa is the continent of the future. Its population will more than double before 2070 and by the end of this century could be larger than India's and China's combined. It is up to Africans to unlock their economic future, matching that population growth with development.

With no one in the world serving up favors to the continent, Mr. Nkrumah's insight about the gains to be had through federation is as salient as ever. What is lacking is sufficient action. The time has come for a continent cut loose in the world to take the next step.

4. The US Must Stop Enabling Israel's Destruction of Gaza

By Christopher McCallion, and Rosemary A. Kelanic

The National Interest, August 14, 2025

URL: <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/the-us-must-stop-enabling-israels-destruction-of-gaza>

Without imposing conditions on Israeli behavior in Gaza Washington risks stoking international terrorism and entangling itself in another Middle East war.

With Gaza leveled, tens of thousands of innocent Palestinians killed, and famine gripping the tiny enclave of over 2 million people, accusations that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza have now gone [mainstream](#), including by Israeli human [rights organizations](#) and prominent Israeli Holocaust [scholars](#). Yet the Israeli government is [persisting](#) with plans to forcibly expel Gazans under the guise of “voluntary” [emigration](#).

Shamefully, President Donald Trump continues to underwrite Israeli actions diplomatically and fiscally. In 2024 alone, Washington granted Israel an extra [\\$8.7 billion](#) in military aid on top of the nearly [\\$4 billion](#) the United States annually provides. The Trump administration [expedited](#) those deliveries in March 2025. Just last week, the Senate rejected a bill to halt arms shipments to Israel, with [unanimous](#) opposition from Trump’s fellow Republicans.

Condoning Israeli war crimes in Gaza is particularly inexplicable because it is both morally unjust and harmful to US national interests. Moral considerations sometimes conflict with strategic imperatives in international politics, with the result being that countries must swallow their ethical concerns for the sake of national security. But in this case, both arrows point in the same direction: the looming Gaza genocide is a moral abomination that also hurts US interests. It makes no sense for the United States to support it, and Trump should stop doing so immediately.

The depravity of the Gaza situation is undeniable, given the massive loss of civilian life. The Gaza Health Ministry has confirmed [over 60,000 deaths](#), though the [true toll](#) is [likely much higher](#). The population of Gaza is now on [the verge of mass starvation](#), and deaths from hunger—particularly among children—are [rising](#).

These numbers are driven in part by Israel’s cynical [use of starvation](#) as a weapon against the Geneva Convention. Most of the meager food Israel has allowed in since ending its two-month food [embargo](#) in May 2025 has been distributed by armed US security contractors and monitored by IDF soldiers. These sites have become “[death traps](#)” where the UN estimates [more than 1,000 people](#) have been killed while queuing for rations. Eggregiously, the sites are cynically located in active war zones and are positioned to draw Palestinians away from the north of Gaza towards the Egyptian border, functioning as a “fig leaf” for forced displacement.

And indeed, mass Palestinian emigration is the goal, according to Israel’s stated plans. In May, the Israeli Cabinet [approved](#) maximalist war aims that explicitly include seizing Gaza, forcing out its two million Palestinian residents, and permanently resettling the territory.

Since then, ominous proposals for the forced displacement of Gaza’s two million Palestinian inhabitants have circulated among [Israeli](#) and [US officials](#). These proposals alternatively envision confining the Gazan population into a tiny “humanitarian city” in Rafah; removing them to multiple “Humanitarian Transit Areas” in southern Gaza or outside the Strip; or even [sending them](#) to third countries like Ethiopia, Indonesia, or Libya.

The United States cannot claim ignorance of what it is enabling in Gaza because Israel has broadcast its intentions for months, unlike in other atrocities that [unfolded quickly](#) and with little

warning. Trump himself has provided political cover for ethnic cleansing by suggesting that the United States “take over” Gaza and establish a “[freedom zone](#).” Such statements may be chimerical, but they have real consequences: Israeli prime minister Netanyahu has been pushing to clear Gaza under the [mantle](#) of the “Trump plan.”

Beyond the moral case against it, US assistance for Israel’s assault in Gaza raises two significant national security risks.

The first is renewed terrorism. The destruction of Gaza has increased the threat of terrorism to Americans at home and abroad, with potentially “[generational](#)” impacts, according to former Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines. [Multiple domestic attacks](#) have been linked to the conflict, and the threat will increase as the situation grows more dire. A full US “takeover” of Gaza, as Trump has proposed, would “turbocharge terrorist recruitment and global anti-American violence,” according to one [expert](#).

Terrorism is not an existential threat to the United States, but we shouldn’t be endangering the safety of American citizens by pursuing bad policies with no upside.

The second, greater risk is that Israel’s Gaza offensive could further entangle the United States in unnecessary Middle Eastern wars. In fact, the United States has already been drawn into three conflicts on Israel’s behalf as violence in Gaza raged. Israel’s campaign [motivated](#) the Houthis to [attack Red Sea shipping](#) in retaliation, which spurred Washington into a foolish [\\$7 billion](#) air war that put US service-members’ [lives at risk](#) and caused multiple injuries.

Gaza also dragged the United States into a dangerous back-and-forth with Iran in October 2024, when US [military assets](#) defended Israel from Iranian airstrikes. Iran’s attack was retaliation for the killing of Hezbollah and Hamas leaders by Israel as it tried to stop Hezbollah rocket attacks, which began right [after](#) Israel invaded Gaza.

Finally, Israel [successfully drew](#) the United States into a [preventive attack](#) on Iran, which [derailed planned talks](#) with Tehran over its nuclear program. While not directly driven by Gaza, the Israel-Iran war underlines the risks of unconditionally close ties to Israel as it acts aggressively towards its neighbors, from [Lebanon](#) to [Syria](#) to [Iran](#) and beyond.

Gaza is a clear case where moral and strategic considerations align. The United States has no strategic reason—and therefore, absolutely no excuse—to help Israel commit war crimes in Gaza. The American public understands this, which is why support for Israeli actions in Gaza has [plummeted](#). Why can’t Trump?

5. A Haven for English in the Most French of North American Cities

For Quebec City's tiny English-speaking community, a former jail turned library serves as an essential sanctuary in a metropolis where the domination of French is enshrined in law.

By Ian Austen

The New York Times, August 11, 2025

URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/11/world/canada/quebec-city-morrin-centre.html>

When Kristy Findlay moved to Quebec City after her American-born husband accepted a job there, she soon developed a longing.

"I would go to parks with my young children, I would hear a little English spoken, and I feel like: Oh my gosh, I'm hungry for it," said Ms. Findlay, who was raised in Ontario.

As the capital of a province that vigorously defends its use of French from the sea of English that surrounds it, Quebec City has become a place where Canada's otherwise majority language is almost an afterthought: Just 2.3 percent of its population, about 17,000 people, identify as primarily English speakers in Canada's census.

A series of provincial laws enacted over the last five decades that were meant to assert the dominance of French, along with Quebec's separatist movement, prompted an exodus of many English speakers to other parts of Canada.

But even in this Francophone redoubt, Ms. Findlay was ultimately able to find a place where her craving for conversation in her native language could be sated.

At a former jail and Presbyterian college standing amid the cobblestone streets of the city's historic Upper Town, a discreet sign above the entrance, reading simply "Morrin," gives no hint of the linguistic heterodoxy taking place inside.

The Morrin Cultural Centre acts as a hub for Quebec City's English speakers much the same way as outposts of the [Goethe-Institut](#) do for Germans living abroad. It's a place for books, education, conversation and, above all, it's a reminder to English speakers that they aren't alone.

At its heart is the city's only English-language library. With its cast iron balcony railings and green leather chairs, it still has a decided 19th-century flavor, even if its wooden shelves are filled with contemporary titles.

While the library is a wonder, and the center's exhibitions, lectures and children's programming are welcome bonuses, the center is most important for Ms. Findlay and many others as a sanctuary where English conversation flows without embarrassment or apology.

"We have this precarity with the government, but the Morrin Centre belongs to us — this is ours," said Ms. Findlay, who moved to Quebec City about 15 years ago. "It's a place we can go and hear English and speak English — a safe space."

While the Morrin Centre has become the English-speaking community's hub, it's not the only local institution helping bind the members: There's a weekly newspaper, a local CBC Radio station, English-language churches, English public schools and a junior college.

The position of Quebec City's small English minority has not always been so comfortable.

Richard Walling's memories of attending high school in Quebec City during the 1970s, a peak time for Quebec nationalism, are not all fond ones.

"When you were outside of the school environment, you would not dare speak English in public, on the city bus or anything like that," said Mr. Walling, the head of Jeffery Hale

Community Partners, a charity that provides health and social services to the English-speaking community. “It was really a tough time.”

Diane Kameen, who moved from Manitoba to Quebec to study French in 1980 and never left, recalled how the community generally kept a low profile in those days, trying not to ruffle any feathers.

“We have a small but very dynamic population that’s managed to hang on and ride out that storm,” Ms. Kameen said.

Still, official antipathy toward English continues. The provincial government recently introduced a series of measures mandating French, including requiring most public servants to work exclusively in French; limiting access to English services for immigrants; and introducing a tough French test for English-speaking junior college students. And many more private companies now must conduct business in French after the threshold was lowered to 25 employees.

But Mr. Walling said the general hostility toward English speakers in Quebec City has dissipated, in large part because of the city’s economic transformation. During his high school years the main employers were the provincial government, which did not value English-language skills, and industries that mostly served other companies within the province.

Now the city is a center for video game developers and other tech companies that sell their products worldwide and that have to recruit employees, many of whom are English speakers, from outside Quebec.

Nevertheless, Mr. Walling offered English-speaking newcomers some advice for living in Quebec City.

“If you come here thinking you’re going to be able to live everything in English, you had better leave because you won’t be happy,” he said. “If you embrace both the English and the French, it’s a wonderful place.”

With the exodus of English speakers in the 1980s, the Morrin Centre suffered something of a slump, with much of the building uninhabitable and decaying.

Money was so tight, remembers Ms. Kameen, a board member at the time, that “the big decision as a board member back then was if we would get an electric typewriter.”

A series of fund-raising events and government grants financed extensive renovations, and the building’s history became an asset.

The cells from its days as a jail had never been removed from the basement, largely because they held up the foundation. They were transformed into a claustrophobic, if evocative, museum about the prison and prison reform in 19th-century Quebec.

The torrent of tourists who descend on Quebec City who now pay for tours of the library and jail have created a reliable revenue source to maintain the building and fund programs.

On a recent evening, a lecture by Sandra Tomaylla, a local photographer and filmmaker, attracted a diverse group of people — including a French speaker, Christian Shriqui.

Originally from Montreal, Mr. Shriqui said he belongs to a book club at the Morrin and regularly attends workshops and poetry readings here — all in English.

“It’s a very rare jewel, a gem,” Mr. Shriqui said, adding that he regularly encounters other French speakers at the events.

Ms. Tomaylla, the night's speaker, arrived in Quebec City at the age of 7 with her family from Peru and was schooled in French, a requirement for most immigrants to Quebec. She had known little about the Morrin Centre until she used the library for a photo shoot.

For someone like her, attracted to English-speaking culture, it has filled a void in her Quebec life.

"I do appreciate Quebec culture, but it's not my culture," she said. "I just thought it was a library and a museum and that they did some events like any other place. But I didn't know they had so many activities and that they had a community. It's amazing. I should have come here earlier."

Пример текста на аудирование

1. Ronald Reagan had a neat trick. When reporters yelled questions at him from a roped-off distance, he would cup his ear and apologize that he couldn't hear. In fact, he had some hearing troubles. But when it came to many issues, he had perfect political pitch. Whether winning a crowd with a quip, relating an anecdote to win points in a speech, or leading the nation in mourning, as he did after the space shuttle disaster, Reagan was finely tuned into an admiring public that genuinely liked him, as even his most begrudging critics acknowledged. But through his eight years in the White House and in the period since President Reagan left office, many views of the Reagan presidency have served up a different perspective.

They depicted a detached, disinterested executive who asked no questions, ignored details, and allowed subordinates to run amok. Even the revelation that the first lady consulted an astrologer, Joan Quigley, whose advice was taken seriously, seemed to slide off Reagan's back. As Bob Woodward later wrote, "the secret practice of making scheduling decisions based on astrology was irritating and irrational. [White House Chief of Staff Donald] Regan believed it was the most closely guarded domestic secret in the Reagan White House."

Almost every memoir by former administration figures—most notably those by David Stockman and Donald Regan—as well as a number of books about Reagan's administration by journalists, such as Hedrick Smith's *The Power Game* and *The Acting President* by Bob Schieffer and Gary Paul Gates, present a picture of Reagan as ill informed and disengaged, with a poor memory and little interest in details. Yet, through most of it, Ronald Reagan held on to extraordinary public approval ratings, if national polls are to be trusted. Reagan's uncanny ability to keep the controversies and problems of his eight years in office from sticking to him prompted the gently derisive nickname of "Teflon president."